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Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6 F.4th 
1321 (D.C. Cir. 2021) 
 
Malcolm M. Gilbert* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2019, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) 
issued Certificate Orders approving project proposals for three liquefied 
natural gas (“LNG”) export terminals and two natural gas pipelines to 
supply one terminal (collectively, “Projects”).1 If constructed, all of the 
terminals would be situated along a shipping channel near Brownsville, 
TX, where the median income is roughly half the national average, and 
93-percent of the population identifies as Hispanic or Latinx.2 The two 
parallel pipelines would bisect four Texas counties over their 135-mile 
course before reaching Brownsville.3 In Vecinos para el Bienestar de la 
Comunidad Costera ("Vecinos") Vecinos para el Bienestar de la 
Comunidad (“Petitioners”) challenged the Orders, arguing ozone pollution 
from the Projects would disproportionately affect lower-income, minority 
individuals in Brownsville-area environmental justice communities. 4 
Further, Petitioners argued the approval orders did not adequately 
rationalize the exclusion of a social cost of carbon tool from FERC’s 
environmental impact statements (“EISs”), especially considering their 
projection that the construction, operations, and export activity from the 
 
*Malcolm Gilbert, Juris Doctor Candidate 2023, Alexander Blewett III 
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1. Order Granting Authorization Under Section 3 of the Natural Gas 
Act, 169 FERC ¶ 61, 130 (2019); Order Granting Authorizations Under Sections 3 
and 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 169 FERC ¶ 61, 131 (2019); Order Granting 
Authorization Under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, 169 FERC ¶ 61, 132 (2019) 
(Hereinafter “FERC Orders”) (Certificate applications for the export terminals were 
submitted by Rio Grande LNG, LLC (“Rio Grande”); Texas LNG, LLC (“Texas 
LNG”); and Annova, LLC (“Annova”). Applications for the two natural gas pipelines 
were submitted by a Rio Grande subsidiary, Rio Bravo Co. (“Rio Bravo”). Before oral 
arguments, intervenor Annova notified FERC they were abandoning their terminal 
project, and the Court granted permission to withdraw from court proceedings); see 
also, 15 U.S.C. § 717(f)(c) (2018) (requiring any natural gas developer to obtain a 
Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (“Certificate Order”) from FERC prior 
to development in order to demonstrate why the project is in the “public interest”).  
2.  U.S. Census Bureau, Brownsville City, Texas, QUICKFACTS, 
https://perma.cc/BY87-NFPY (last updated July 1, 2019). 
3.  Sierra Club Lone Star Chapter, Rio Bravo Pipeline, LOWER RIO 
GRANDE VALLEY GROUP, https://perma.cc/V2VL-8HGP (last visited Sept. 10, 2021). 
4. 6 F.4th 1321, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 2021). 
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Projects would emit a significant amount of greenhouse gases and 
contribute to anthropogenic climate change.5  
This case note will explore the role that environmental justice and 
climate change play in Federal agency decision-making processes, analyze 
the legal framework for the Vecinos decision, and discuss how the 
outcome of this litigation could affect similar project proposals in future 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission decisions.    
 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Petitioners are residents of Laguna Heights, TX, who are 
concerned that increased shipping traffic in the Brownsville Shipping 
Channel will have disruptive economic effects and negative health impacts 
on area residents.6 The local economy depends on tourism and commercial 
fishing, which residents fear will be disrupted by gas tankers.7 By contrast, 
the Projects’ developers contend they will bring thousands of direct and 
indirect jobs to the area, where the unemployment rate is higher than the 
national average, at 6.5-percent. 8  Texas LNG and RioGrande LNG 
(“Developers”) anticipate processing roughly five billion cubic feet of 
LNG per day.9 Over the course of a year, production at their facilities 
would amount to approximately 0.7-percent of the 700 billion cubic feet 
of LNG the U.S. exported to the global market in 2020.10  
In November 2019, Petitioners filed two separate rehearing 
requests to address deficiencies with the Orders under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).11 They alleged the Projects are not 
 
5. Br. Resp’t FERC 34, Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad 
Costera v. FERC, 6 F.4th 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Nos. 20-1093–94 (consolidated)); 
see also, Christina Swanson, Amanda Levin, Sailing to Nowhere: Liquefied Natural 
Gas Is Not An Effective Climate Strategy, Natural Resources Defense Council 
(December 2020), https://perma.cc/5NYG-J2VZ (explaining that greenhouse gas 
emissions from the extraction, transport, liquefaction, and re-gasification of LNG can 
be almost equal to the emissions produced from the actual burning of the gas, 
effectively doubling the climate impact of each unit of energy created from gas 
transported overseas). 
6. Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Local Residents Sue Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission for Approving Fracked Gas Facility (Feb. 20, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/UE6L-RVD3. 
7. Id.  
8. Miranda Wilson, Gas Projects Reveal FERC’s Environmental 
Justice Conundrum, E&E NEWS ENERGYWIRE (Aug. 3, 2021), 
https://perma.cc/5C6D-BX8C. 
9. NEXTDECADE, Community Opportunity: Rio Grande LNG, 
https://perma.cc/72GY-B9LU (last visited Oct. 8, 2021); see also Texas LNG, Project 
Overview, https://perma.cc/ALC5-GME3 (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).  
10. Department of Energy, Liquefied Natural Gas, OFFICE OF FOSSIL 
ENERGY AND CARBON MANAGEMENT, https://perma.cc/E637-ESK6 (last visited Oct. 
8, 2021).  
11. FERC, Process for Natural Gas Certificates, 
https://perma.cc/JQJ3-EQPW (last visited Sept. 10, 2021) (FERC issues a Certificate 
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in the public interest because FERC’s EISs failed to take NEPA’s requisite 
“hard look” at disparate impacts on EJCs, and because they did not 
adequately explain why FERC rejected using a social cost of carbon 
(“SCC”) tool to assess climate impacts.12 In early 2020, FERC denied 
Petitioners’ rehearing requests, arguing its EISs sufficiently addressed 
Petitioners’ concerns.13 Petitioners then filed a petition for judicial review 
in the D.C. Circuit. 14 
 
III.  POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The political background of environmental justice and climate change 
issues are central to understanding how DOE and FERC integrate the 
issues into decision-making processes and provides an essential backdrop 
to the Court’s decision. This section will detail the political history and 
modern standing of each issue to provide appropriate context for the 
Court’s legal framework.  
 
A.  Growing Strength in Environmental Justice 
 
Historically, pollution from oil, gas, and coal emissions has 
disproportionately affected low-income African American communities in 
the United States.15 More generally, industrial pollution has affected all 
lower-income demographic groups more than middle and upper-class 
groups.16 Climate change is expected to exacerbate the negative health 
impacts of pollution and industrial development on lower-income 
communities.17  
Environmental justice advocates mobilized around racial 
inequities in industrial siting and pollution during the Civil Rights Era of 
 
Order as the final step in a sequence of events surrounding a project’s initial 
application and subsequent public comment and environmental impact analyses).  
12. Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6 
F.4th 1321, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 2021). 
13. Id.   
14. Id.  
15. Ihab Mikati, Adam F. Benson, Jennifer Richmond-Bryant, 
Disparities in Distribution of Particulate Matter Emission Sources by Race and 
Poverty Status, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, Apr. 2018, at 480–485; see 
also, Robert D. Bullard, Blacks and the Environment, HUMBOLDT JOURNAL OF SOCIAL 
RELATIONS, 1987, at 165–84 (“[D]isadvantaged people are largely victims of middle- 
and upper-class pollution because they usually live closest to the sources of 
pollution—power plants, industrial installations, and in central cities where vehicle 
traffic is heaviest . . .”).  
16. Bullard, supra note 17, at 165–84.  
17. Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate 
Justice Proposal for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFFALO L. REV. 
169, 179 (2008) (citing reports that negative health impacts like pollution-related 
respiratory illnesses will unevenly affect lower income and minority communities, 
especially in areas with ozone levels that exceed National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards).   
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the 1960s.18 In the 1980s and early 1990s, localized efforts to protect 
lower-income communities and start rectifying environmental injustice 
grew into policymaking at the federal level.19 In 1994, President Clinton 
ordered that “each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental 
justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and 
low-income populations.”20 The Order did not create a private right of 
judicial review, thus it does not have the force of law.21  
The Order did, however, direct the Clinton Administration to 
establish an Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice.22 In 
consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and 
other agencies, the Council on Environmental Quality issued guidance in 
1997 for agencies to follow in addressing environmental justice in the 
NEPA process.23 The guidance recommends that to comply with NEPA, 
agencies should assess the impact and consequences of their decisions on 
environmental justice communities (“EJCs”). 24  Further, agencies are 
required by NEPA to take a “hard look” at “ecological . . . economic, 
social, [and] health” impacts of agency decisions.25  
Critics argue Executive Order 12,898 has not adequately 
addressed environmental justice issues because the Council on 
Environmental Quality guidance lacks legal authority. Gridlock in 
Congress continues to stymie efforts to incorporate environmental justice 
guidance into law, so the executive branch controls progress on achieving 
 
18. EPA, Environmental Justice Timeline, https://perma.cc/FPS6-
DYB8 (last visited Sept. 23, 2021).  
19. Id.  
20. FEDERAL ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN 
MINORITY POPULATIONS AND LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS, Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 
1-101, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994); see also EPA, Environmental Justice, 
https://perma.cc/54LS-KHBS (last visited Oct. 9, 2021) (defining environmental 
justice as the “fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of 
race, color, national origin, or income, with respect to the development, 
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies”). 
21. Id. § 6-609. 
22. Id. § 1-102.  
23. Executive Office of the President, Environmental Justice: 
Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy Act, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. 
QUALITY (Dec. 10, 1997), https://perma.cc/7MJ4-9GF8.   
24. EPA, Federal Interagency Working Group on Environmental 
Justice (EJ IWG), ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, https://perma.cc/SM2J-UW8W (last 
updated Aug., 2021) (defining EJCs broadly as minority and low-income populations 
that are susceptible to disproportionately high and adverse human health or 
environmental effects of EPA programs); see also EPA, Climate Change and Social 
Vulnerability in the United Stated: A Focus on Six Impacts, OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC 
PROGRAMS (Sept. 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/HSC3-QJ37 (defining “low income” 
individuals as those living in households with income that is 200-percent of the 
poverty level or lower).   
25. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2002).  
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environmental justice. 26  Administration changes often reverse agency 
priorities and undermine that progress.27 In January 2021, President Biden 
re-prioritized the aims of Executive Order 12,898 by rescinding Trump 
Era rulemakings, policies, and executive orders that sought to deregulate 
industry at the cost of environmental justice and progressive climate 
policy.28  President Biden’s Executive Order 14,008 catalogs ambitious 
climate goals that re-prioritize the environmental justice and climate issues 
under Council on Environmental Quality guidance.29 
 
B.  Vacillating Federal Climate Priorities 
  
Improvements in environmental justice are inextricably bound to 
the existential threat of climate change. 30  Climate disasters—drought, 
hurricanes, floods, and wildfires—disproportionately impact communities 
who have less mobility than middle- and upper-income communities do to 
adapt to or recover from them. 31  Greenhouse gas emissions are the 
principal cause of anthropogenic climate change. Behind China, the 
United States is the second largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world.32 
 Legislative efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. 
and combat anthropogenic climate change have been railroaded by 
gridlock in Congress, much like environmental justice legislation. 33 
Notwithstanding its failures to pass climate legislation, the Obama 
Administration Council on Environmental Quality and Interagency 
 
26.  Environmental Justice: The Social and Demographic Impact of 
Environmental Choice, 4 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.1, 4(D)(iii) 
(Matthew and Bender Co., 2021) (hereinafter “Environmental Justice”).  
27. See, e.g., Brie D. Sherwin, The Upside Down: A New Reality for 
Science at the EPA and its Impact on Environmental Justice, 27 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
57, 74 (2019) (describing the change in regulatory priorities between the Obama and 
Trump Administrations); see also Uma Outka, Elizabeth K. Warner, Reversing 
Course on Environmental Justice Under the Trump Administration, 54 Wake Forest 
L. Rev. 393, 413–14 (2019) (describing how the Trump Administration reversed 
environmental justice priorities in ways that negatively impacted diverse 
communities, such as the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe in relation to the Dakota Access 
Pipeline). 
28.  ENSURING THE FUTURE IS MADE IN ALL OF AMERICA BY ALL OF 
AMERICA’S WORKERS, Exec. Order No. 14,005, 86 Fed. Reg. 17,7475 (Jan. 28, 2021).  
29.  TACKLING THE CLIMATE CRISIS AT HOME AND ABROAD, Exec. 
Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 19,7619 (Feb. 1, 2021); see Ellen M. Gilmer, Biden 
Bolsters DOJ Focus on Environmental Justice, Climate, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jan. 27, 
2021), https://perma.cc/UM6Z-MGQ2 (detailing the Biden Administration’s climate 
goals).  
30. Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States: A 
Focus on Six Impacts, EPA, 430-R-21-003, 6 (Sept. 21, 2021), 
https://perma.cc/4BVM-6CKH (key findings indicate that because Hispanic and 
Latinx communities have high participation in weather-exposed industries, they are 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change). 
31. Id. at 9.  
32. Ian Tiseo, Global CO2 Emissions by Country 2009-2019, 
STATISTA (Jan. 4, 2021), https://perma.cc/M7JC-HCS2.   
33. Environmental Justice, supra note 28, at 4(D)(iii). 
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Working Group on SCC published technical guidance for agencies to 
better assess the costs and benefits of regulations in the context of 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. 34  The Council on 
Environmental Quality guidance provides specific recommendations for 
agencies to incorporate carbon pricing and discount rates into decision-
making processes.  
Notably, the Vecinos proceedings began during the Trump 
Administration.35 President Trump disbanded the Interagency Working 
Group on SCC in March 2017, and his Office of Management and Budget 
lowered Obama-era discount rates.36 Along with environmental justice 
issues, President Biden reprioritized SCC policies and restored Obama-era 
Council on Environmental Quality guidance under Executive Order 
13,990.37 Biden’s Office of Management and Budget reset discount rates 
to Obama-era standards, and the Interagency Working Group on SCC has 
reconvened (it is now called the Interagency Working Group on Social 
Cost of Greenhouse Gases) to develop guidance that better reflects a fast-
evolving understanding of climate change.38 
 
IV.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
To lay out the legal framework for the Vecinos decision, the D.C. 
Circuit Court outlined the regulatory decision-making authority of the 
Department of Energy (“DOE”) and FERC regarding environmental 
justice and climate issues.  
 
A.  The Natural Gas Act of 1938 
 
FERC and DOE share responsibility for regulating the domestic 
transport and export of natural gas.39 DOE regulates the export of LNG, 
and the Natural Gas Act requires FERC’s approval for the construction 
and operation of gas pipelines.40 DOE delegated siting, construction, and 
operations authority to FERC, meaning FERC is responsible for decision-
 
34. Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, Technical 
Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under 
Executive Order 12866, 3, (Feb., 2010), https://perma.cc/3XLF-FZZS.   
35. FERC Orders, supra note 1.   
36. PROMOTING ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 
Exec. Order No. 13,653, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093, 16093-16097 (Mar. 31, 2017); see also 
Dana Nuccitelli, The Trump EPA is Vastly Underestimating the Cost of Carbon 
Dioxide Pollution to Society, New Research Finds, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS 
(July 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/Q6K6-5FFE.  
37. Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, 
Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide: 
Interim Estimates under Executive Order 13990, 5 (Feb. 2021), 
https://perma.cc/NR7H-6PG3. 
38. Id. 
39. 42 U.S.C § 7151(b) (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) et seq.; see also 
Pub. L. No. 95–91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977). 
40. 15 U.S.C. § 717f (c)(1)(A).  
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making surrounding the location and construction of pipelines and export 
terminals.41  
The Projects implicate FERC’s authority under the Natural Gas 
Act.42 FERC must authorize the construction and operation of a proposed 
LNG facility unless it determines that the facility will not be consistent 
with the public interest. 43  Conversely, FERC may not authorize the 
construction and operation of a proposed interstate LNG pipeline unless it 
determines the pipeline is or will be required by the present or future public 
convenience and necessity.44 
To discern whether a project is in the “public convenience and 
necessity,” FERC is required to consider conservation and environmental 
issues, as well as impacts on gas consumers and the development of gas 
supplies. 45  FERC’s “Certificate Policy Statement” further clarifies the 
public convenience and necessity standard, providing that FERC will issue 
a certificate if a project’s public benefits outweigh its adverse effects (i.e. 
meeting unserved market demand versus deleterious environmental 
impacts on surrounding communities).46 The certificate gives FERC legal 
authority to exercise eminent domain in land acquisitions necessary for the 
pipelines’ construction.47 
 
B.  NEPA  
 
NEPA is the Nation’s “basic national charter for protection of the 
environment,”48 and it requires that an EIS must be prepared if a decision 
constitutes a major federal action that will significantly affect the quality 
of the human environment.49 Under NEPA, a federal agency must take a 
“hard look” at the potential impacts of its decision. 50  A “hard look” 
requires considerations of alternatives, environmental impacts, and any 
adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided should the proposed 
 
41  Delegation Order No. 00-004.00A, § 1.21.A, (Dept. Energy May 
16, 2006), https://perma.cc/K8KG-F226 (May 16, 2006) (renewing delegation to 
FERC over the construction and operation of LNG facilities); see also Vecinos para 
el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6 F.4th 1321, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 2021). 
42. 15 U.S.C. § 717b; 15 U.S.C. § 717f. 
43. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a).  
44. Id.; see also Valerie L. Chartier-Hogancamp, Fairness and Justice: 
Discrepancies in Eminent Domain for Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines, 49 TEX. ENVTL. 
L.J. 67, 74 (2019). 
45.  Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety v. FERC, 762 F.3d 
97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1373 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017).  
46.  Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 
FERC ¶ 61, 227 (1999); clarified, 90 FERC ¶ 61, 128 (2000); further clarified, 92 
FERC ¶ 61, 094 (2000); see also City of Oberlin, Ohio v. FERC, 937 F.3d 599, 602 
(D.C. Cir. 2019).  
47. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).  
48. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety 
Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1185 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a)).   
49. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2018).  
50. Ctr. For Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1194.  
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action take effect. 51  Agencies must also consider foreseeable indirect 
effects, connected actions, similar actions, and account for the cumulative 
effects of any incremental impacts, added to other past, present, and 
reasonably foreseeable future actions. 52  
 
C.  The Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) 
 
Courts review NEPA decisions against the APA “arbitrary or 
capricious” standard.53  In reviewing an agency decision, the Court “will 
not ‘flyspeck’ an agency’s environmental analysis, looking for any 
deficiency no matter how minor.”54 Instead, the Court  looks to determine 
whether an agency gave the matter the requisite “hard look” under NEPA, 
ensuring the agency adequately considered the environmental impacts of 
its actions and its decision is not arbitrary or capricious.55  The Court gives 
deference to the agency when evaluating data within the agency's technical 
expertise.56 
 
V.  DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COURT RULING 
 
The Court remanded FERC’s approval orders for three reasons. 
First, the EJCs FERC identified did not adequately encompass the region 
that would be impacted by ozone emissions.57 Second, FERC failed to 
respond to Petitioners’ complaint that FERC was required to use an SCC 
tool but refused to.58  Finally, the Court found that FERC erroneously 
awarded Rio Bravo a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity 
because of its failure to satisfy NEPA, ruling that a “hard look” is 
necessary to reasonably balance a project’s economic benefits with its 
negative impacts and establish public interest.59 
The Court remanded without vacatur because it expected FERC 
could remedy deficiencies in its EIS on remand without causing 
inequitable delay to the project development.  
 
A.  Did Census Blocks Adequately Represent Potentially Affected EJCs? 
 
 FERC projected the impact of the Projects on EJCs by quantifying 
the amount of air pollution that would affect individuals within two-mile 
 
51. Id. 
52. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b); see also Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. 
FERC, 753 F.3d 1304, 1309 (D.C.  Cir.  2014) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25). 
53. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018). 
54. Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
55. Nat’l Comm. for the New River v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1323, 1327 
(D.C. Cir. 2004).  
56. Id.  
57.  Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6 
F.4th 1321, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 2021). 
58.  Id. at 1329. 
59. Id. at 1331. 
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radius census blocks surrounding the project area.60 The Court held that 
FERC's EIS did not adequately explain why a two-mile range adequately 
represented potential EJC health impacts when the EISs acknowledged air 
pollution had the potential to reach a distance as far as thirty-one miles 
away.61 FERC was required under NEPA to provide a reasonable and 
adequate explanation for its decision to delineate the area potentially 
affected by the project by making a “rational connection between the facts 
found and the decision made.”62 The Court stipulated that on remand, 
FERC must provide that explanation and further explain whether its 
conclusions still comport with its position that the projects would not 
disproportionately and adversely affect minority and low-income 
residents.63  
 
B.  Should Climate Impacts have been Analyzed? 
 
 FERC estimated the amount of greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with the construction and operation of the Projects.64 However, 
it concluded it could not determine the significance of the Projects’ impact 
on climate change because there is not a universally accepted method for 
doing so. 65  The Court ruled that if FERC cannot obtain information 
relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts, like 
impacts surrounding climate change, under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21(c) it must 
include an evaluation of the impacts based upon theoretical approaches or 
methods generally accepted in the science community. 66  Petitioners 
alleged FERC did not include any such evaluation within its EISs. The 
Court held that, regardless of FERC’s statutory obligation to analyze the 
climate impacts of the Projects, under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21(c), it was 
incumbent on FERC to respond to a central statutory question raised by 
Petitioners.67 The Court held that because FERC raised the issue of climate 
change in its EIS, but failed to respond to Petitioners’ complaints, its EIS 
was deficient.68 The Court ordered that on remand, FERC must explain 
whether the statute calls for it to apply an SCC tool or some other generally 
accepted protocol, and if not, to provide a reasonable explanation for its 
decision.69  
 
C.  Is the Rio Bravo Pipeline in the Public Interest? 
 
 
60. Br. Resp’t FERC 41. 
61. Vecinos, 6 F.4th at 1330 (D.C. Cir. 2021).  
62. Id. (citing Cmtys. Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. F.A.A., 355 
F.3d at 689 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Don’t abbrev FAA 
63. Id. at 20.  
64. Br. Resp’t FERC 69. 
65. Vecinos, 6 F.4th at 1328. 
66. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21(c) (2012).  
67. Vecinos, 6 F.4th at 1329. 
68. Id.  
69. Id. at 1330.  
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The Court held that FERC’s failure to adequately explain its use of two-
mile radius census blocks indicates its Natural Gas Act public interest 
analysis was deficient. 70 During “exceedance events,” ambient air quality 
impact might reach 76.5 parts per billion (“ppb”), exceeding the 70 ppb 
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (“NAAQS”). 71  Further, ozone 
pollution has the potential to reach a distance as far as thirty-one miles 
away.72 FERCs public interest analysis was not grounded in a “rational 
connection between the facts found and the decision made.”73 If pollution 
has the potential to impact individuals thirty-one miles away, FERC had 
an obligation to adequately explain why two-mile radius census blocks are 
an appropriate representation of impacted EJCs.74 The Court ordered that 
on remand, FERC must address whether its conclusion that the projects 
are in the public interest still holds, or otherwise reasonably explain why 
it is not obligated to consider them.75  
 
VI.  ANALYSIS 
  
 Although the Vecinos Court ruled only on procedural NEPA 
violations, the substantive disagreements between FERC and Petitioners 
highlight the transformation that took place during the Trump Era in 
relation to environmental justice and climate policy. Further, the 
arguments offer insight into policy issues that are likely to be addressed 
under the Biden Administration, which has already demonstrated its 
commitment to doing. 
 
A.  FERC’s Flexible Rules for Determining Impacts on EJCs 
 
During NEPA review, environmental justice guidelines 
recommend that agencies take a “hard look” at the impacts its projects 
have on low-income and minority communities.76 Practically, the agencies 
may choose to use land areas of any size to define EJCs nearby a project 
if it provides a reasonable explanation for doing so.  
 FERC argued the Projects would not disproportionately affect 
EJCs on three bases. First, FERC maintained that because the EJC it 
identified in two-mile radius census blocks has a similar composition to 
the rest of South Texas, the census blocks represented the entire region 
that could be affected by air quality pollution.77 Second, it suggested its air 
quality analysis projects a worst-case scenario, therefore normal 
 
70. Id.  
71.  Br. Resp’t FERC 61. 
72. Vecinos, 6 F.4th at 1330.  
73. Id.  
74.  Id.  
75. Id. at 1331. 
76. Executive Office of the President, Environmental Justice: 
Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy Act, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. 
QUALITY (Dec. 10, 1997), https://perma.cc/7MJ4-9GF8. 
77. Br. Resp’t FERC 56. 
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operations would not have disparate effects on the health of the EJCs it 
identified in the project area.78 Finally, it argued that the local economic 
benefits outweigh potential negative impacts on the local tourism, fishing 
economies, and property values.79 
FERC determined the projects would not disproportionately affect 
EJCs because its air quality projections were conservative and reflected 
the worst-case scenario. 80  During “exceedance events,” ambient air 
quality impact might reach 76.5 parts per billion (“ppb”), exceeding the 
70 ppb National Ambient Air Quality Standard (“NAAQS”). The 
exceedance event calculations assumed operation of the facilities at full 
capacity.81 FERC argued the facilities would ordinarily operate at a low 
enough capacity such that ambient air quality would not surpass the 
Standard,82  and thus concluded that the NAAQS was a “reasonable proxy 
for the potential health impacts, including the environmental justice 
community.”83  
FERC also looked at whether the demographic features of 
different communities surrounding the projects make them particularly 
susceptible to respiratory disease.84 However, Petitioners noted that FERC 
only addressed the question of whether certain races or ethnic groups 
would be more susceptible than others, neglecting to consider factors such 
as age and lack of healthcare access. FERC failed to explain why the 
NAAQS are the appropriate metric for determining impacts on EJCs 
without consideration of those additional factors.85 Further, FERC did not 
adequately explain options to mitigate the negative health effects from air 
emissions, such as measures that might reduce air emissions from shipping 
vessels responsible for liquid natural gas exports. 86  
Finally, Petitioners argued that FERC did not adequately explain 
potential non-greenhouse gas effects in its conclusion that positive effects 
on the labor market outweighed negative impacts on property values, the 
fishing industry, and the tourism economy. In its EISs, FERC found the 
“cumulative impacts on property values by the three Brownsville projects 
were not reasonably foreseeable and therefore appropriately omitted from 
the environmental review,” and the projects would “not be expected to 
affect regional tourism patterns or the overall level of visitation to the 
region.”87 FERC did not indicate how it reached that conclusion, nor the 
methods it used to conduct its cost-benefit analysis.88 
 
78. Br. Resp’t FERC 35-36. 
79. Br. Resp’t FERC 43. 
80. Br. Resp’t FERC 35. 
81. Br. Resp’t FERC 61. 
82. Br. Resp’t FERC 61. 
83. Br. Resp’t FERC 61. 
84. Br. Resp’t FERC 64. 
85. Pet’r’s Final J. Reply Br. at 23, Vecinos para el Bienestar de la 
Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6 F.4th 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Nos. 20-1093–94 
(consolidated)). 
86. Pet’r’s Final J. Reply Br. 29.  
87. Br. Resp’t FERC 46. 
88. Pet’r’s Final J. Reply Br. 51.  
 Public Land and Resources Law Review Vol. 0 12 
Notwithstanding the substantive disagreements surrounding 
impacts to EJCs, the Court ruled only on the narrow scope of FERC’s use 
of census blocks to describe the Projects’ potential impacts on EJCs. The 
geographic scope of environmental justice analyses is often a sticking 
point during NEPA review. Agencies may manipulate the scale of land 
areas used to describe EJCs if they provide a reasonable explanation for 
doing so.  
The juxtaposition between Vecinos and a similar decision from 
this Court demonstrates exactly how agencies can manipulate their 
analyses to favor particular outcomes.89 In Sierra Club, the petitioners 
claimed that proposed natural gas pipeline projects would 
disproportionately affect low-income and minority groups in Alabama, 
Georgia, and Florida.90 The Court found FERC had done its due diligence 
by analyzing similar potential health impacts on surrounding 
communities.91 Further, FERC had reasonably compared alternate routes 
with its preferred route and concluded any alternative would pose similar 
impacts on lower-income and minority communities.92  
Notably, FERC used census tracts to describe EJCs in Sierra 
Club, rather than their smaller subunit, the census block.93 In Sierra Club, 
describing EJCs with census tracts was more suitable for advancing the 
Sabal Trail Pipeline because the census tracts encompassed distant, more 
affluent neighborhoods. The census tracts effectively buried pocket 
minority communities in a broader dataset, even though those groups tend 
to live much closer to compressors and other harmful gas infrastructure.94 
By contrast, in Vecinos, FERC used much smaller, two-mile census blocks 
to describe EJCs even though their own data showed a potential for 
broader regional health impacts. Census blocks were better suited to 
Developers’ goals because they improved the Projects’ optics by 
diminishing the public perception of harm.  
As FERC indicated, the demographic composition throughout the 
rest of South Texas is much like Brownsville.95 If FERC broadens the 
scope of its environmental justice analysis on remand, it will likely find  
representative census tracts have a similar composition as the two-mile 
radius census blocks.96 Denial of permit vacatur is essentially an invitation 
from the Court to provide the few changes necessary to satisfy the 
 
89. Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
90. Id. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. 
93. Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1370.   
94. Sean Sullivan, ‘Environmental Justice’ at Center of Suit Against 
FERC’s Sabal Trail Approval, S&P GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 20, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/39Y9-TVYG. 
95. Br. Resp’t FERC 56. 
96. Id.  
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“arbitrary and capricious” standard and advance the projects, much like 
the outcome of Sierra Club.97 
President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,898 did not create a 
private right to judicial review.98 Further, NEPA does not require that 
agencies provide more than a “reasonable explanation” for permitting 
projects with a potentially disproportionate impact on EJCs. 99  The 
interplay of NEPA and the APA only requires an agency to provide an 
explanation that is neither arbitrary nor capricious.100 The outcome of the 
Vecinos decision likely rings hollow with critics of Executive Order 
12,898 because it does not provide a new footing for EJC challenges, and 
instead demonstrates how an agency can manipulate environmental justice 
analyses to better suit the interests of developers.  
 
B.  Trouble with Monetizing Carbon  
 
The courts have consistently recognized that NEPA does not 
require the use of an SCC tool, nor does it require a cost-benefit analysis 
that incorporates greenhouse gas emissions.101 In Vecinos, FERC argued 
NEPA does not provide a substantive requirement to monetize the 
projects’ social costs of carbon, and for policy reasons, it chose not to do 
so.102  FERC offered three primary points to support its argument that 
monetizing the SCC would not “meaningfully inform its project-level 
NEPA review”: 
 (1) EPA states that 'no consensus exists on the 
appropriate [discount] rate to use for analyses spanning 
multiple generations' and, consequently, significant 
variation in output can result';  
(2) 'the tool does not measure the actual incremental 
impacts of a project on the environment'; and  
(3) 'there are no established criteria identifying the 
monetized values that are to be considered significant for 
NEPA reviews.103  
 
97.  Gavin Bade, FERC issues Final Sabal Trail EIS, Potentially 
Avoiding Hold on Project, UTILITY DIVE (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=135257; see also Maya Weber, Sabal Trail, 
Hillabee projects get two more years from US FERC to complete work, S & P GLOBAL 
(Jun. 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/EEC7-HM7T.  
98. FEDERAL ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN 
MINORITY POPULATIONS AND LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS, Exec. Order No. 12,898 § 
6-609, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
99. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety 
Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1194 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing C.F.R. § 1500.1(a)). 
100. Nat’l Comm. for the New River v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1323, 1327 
(D.C. Cir. 2004). 
101.  Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 377 
F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1241 (D. Colo. 2019).  
102. Br. Resp’t FERC 60. 
103. Br. Resp’t FERC 60. 
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FERC additionally argued that the SCC tool “no longer represents 
government policy” because the tool was “withdrawn as no longer 
representative of governmental policy” by President Trump with 
Executive Order 13,783 in 2017.104  
FERC circumnavigated an adequate and reasonable explanation 
for the carbon costs of the project with a strawman, arguing that if it had 
monetized the costs of greenhouse gases, then it would have had to 
monetize the social benefits of the proposed project to appropriately 
balance the SCC tool’s projected costs.105 Petitioners note that FERC did 
monetize many of those costs, at least to the extent needed to write them 
off. For example, FERC explained the shipping from the projects would 
not have a significant impact on local tourism and commercial fishing 
economies.106  
FERC premised its SCC argument on the assertion that there is no 
consensus surrounding an appropriate discount to be applied.107 FERC was 
correct that 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 establishes the merits and drawbacks of 
proposed projects do not need to be reflected monetarily when there are 
important qualitative considerations to consider. 108  Although there is 
neither a statutory obligation nor a consensus as to the appropriate method 
for monetizing carbon, the use of either a 3-percent rate or below is 
generally accepted in the scientific community.109 Petitioners’ rehearing 
request pointed out that where an agency finds guidance lacking around a 
particular impact, “agencies must use generally accepted methods to 
analyze impacts even where those methods are imperfect or cannot 
provide the exact information the agency would prefer.”110 Further, they 
indicated that FERC previously found the use of an SCC tool is generally 
accepted within the regulatory community.111 Because FERC estimated 
the greenhouse gases associated with the projects but did not adequately 
explain why they excluded an SCC analysis, it was incumbent on them to 
address the Petitioners’ challenge under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21(c).112  
Petitioners did not persuade the Court on the merits of their 
substantive climate claims. Rather, they persuaded the Court because of 
procedural deficiencies in FERC’s briefing and rehearing denials. FERC 
neglected to adhere to its statutory obligation to respond to Petitioners’ 
 
104. Br. Resp’t FERC 75. 
105. Br. Resp’t FERC 59-60. 
106. Br. Resp’t FERC 43. 
107.  Br. Resp’t FERC 73. 
108. Br. Resp’t FERC 64. 
109.  See, e.g., Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of 
Greenhouse Gases, Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, 
and Nitrous Oxide: Interim Estimates under Executive Order 13990, 20 (Feb. 2021), 
https://perma.cc/3LJD-FXHU (survey of over 200 experts found three-quarters agreed 
the median risk-free social discount rate of 2 percent was acceptable) (citation 
omitted). 
110.  Pet’r’s Final J. Reply Br. 37. 
111.  Pet’r’s Final J. Reply Br. 44. 
112.  Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6 
F.4th 1321, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2021).  
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claims under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21(c), and the Court provided it with the 
opportunity to fix that error on remand.113 The Court’s order only requires 
FERC to address deficiencies in the EISs at a project-level. Therefore, 
FERC may either apply an appropriate discount rate, or provide a more 
thorough explanation for why a generally accepted method is unworkable, 
which may well be the case given other, less predictable externalities like 
global market trends. 
The Brownsville Projects are among dozens of other large-scale 
natural gas developments proposed, or in development, across the 
country.114  FERC approved ten other natural gas projects within nine 
months of approving the Projects here.115 Recently, the EPA urged FERC 
to adopt an SCC tool in response to the surge of gas approvals flooding 
the wake of retired coal-fired power plants and new gaps in the energy 
marketplace.116 For example, Columbia Gulf Transmission has proposed 
facilities in Louisiana that the EPA says would cause over $205 million 
dollars in climate damages per year. 117  Similarly, an Iroquois Gas 
Transmission project could do more than $144 million in annual 
damage.118 
Disagreement surrounding the efficacy of traditional SCC tools to 
combat climate change is multi-faceted. Some environmental advocates 
have criticized the Interagency Working Group’s estimations for being too 
conservative, despite generally acknowledging they are a step in the right 
direction.119 On the other hand, other critics argue that the models reflect 
values and political judgments at the cost of statistical relevance and 
accuracy, because they fail to account for externalities other than 
greenhouse gas emissions.120  
FERC has not indicated precisely how it will respond to EPAs 
recommendations regarding an SCC tool in those projects, nor whether the 
 
113. Id. 
114.  FERC, Major Pipeline Projects Pending, NATURAL GAS, 
https://perma.cc/VG8H-AG9T (last updated July 2021). 
 115.  Miranda Wilson, Gas Projects Reveal FERC’s Environmental 
Justice Conundrum, E&E NEWS ENERGYWIRE (Aug. 3, 2021), 
https://perma.cc/5C6D-BX8C. 
116. East Lateral Xpress Project, 86 Fed. Reg. 35288, 35288 (July 2, 
2021); Enhancement by Compression Project, 86 Fed. Reg. 33705, 33705 (June 25, 
2021); see also More U.S. Coal-Fired Power Plants are Decommissioning as 
Retirements Continue, U.S. ENERGY INFO ADMIN. (July 26, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/848D-JA4C.  
117. East Lateral Xpress Project, 86 Fed. Reg. 35288, 35288 (July 2, 
2021). 
118. Enhancement by Compression Project, 86 Fed. Reg. 33705, 33705 
(June 25, 2021). 
119. See, e.g., Melissa J. Luttrell, The Social Cost of Inertia: How Cost-
Benefit Incoherence Threatens to Derail U.S. Climate Policy, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 131, 170–82 (2014); see also Over 120,000 Stand Up for a Social Cost of 
Carbon, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Feb. 26, 2014), https://perma.cc/Q5Y5-J98T.  
120. Robert Pindyck, THE USE AND MISUSE OF MODELS FOR CLIMATE 
POLICY (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 21097, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/2NBY-DD66. 
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recommendations will inform decision-making generally. In a March 18, 
2021, decision, FERC considered the significance of a proposed natural 
gas pipeline project’s greenhouse gas emissions and their contribution to 
climate change for the first time. 121  That decision indicates FERC is 
beginning to approach climate change challenges head-on—at least 
providing an explanation for conclusions surrounding emissions, whether 
it changes the course of the decision or not. 
 
D.  A Strategy Change under New Leadership? 
 
Public interest balancing tends to weigh in favor of substantial 
economic benefits, but FERC’s approach to factoring environmental 
justice and climate issues into its cost-benefit analyses may be evolving.  
FERC manipulated the land area used to describe EJCs in both 
Sierra Club and Vecinos. Although the legal outcomes were different, the 
strategy was consistent with the Trump Administration’s emphasis on 
narrowing the scope of significant and cumulative effects analyses during 
NEPA review.122 So, too, was FERC’s decision not to use an SCC tool for 
lack of consensus and changes in administrative priorities.123 President 
Trump was a staunch advocate for rolling-back, or “streamlining,” NEPA 
review to expedite economic development.124  
When FERC approved the Projects, Richard Glick was the sole 
Democrat and dissenting opinion against the approval orders.125  Glick 
identified the same deficiencies with the projects as Petitioners: the 
environmental justice, greenhouse gas emissions, and public interest 
analyses were either inadequate or too narrow in scope to satisfy NEPA 
and the Natural Gas Act.126 Glick is now the agency head at FERC, and 
has prioritized incorporating the risks of environmental harm due to 
climate change in agency decision making. The Biden Administration and 
Chairman Glick’s renewed emphasis on environmental justice and climate 
is yet to transform project-level siting and decision making around LNG 
infrastructure. Nevertheless, Chairman Glick recently indicated FERC is 
committed to reviewing environmental justice and climate issues on a 
case-by-case basis.127 Further, he emphasized his priority at FERC is to 
mitigate the legal risk to developers and the federal government, couching 
 
121. Northern Natural Gas Commpany Order Issuing Certificate and 
Approving Abandonment, 174 FERC ¶ 61, 189 (2021). 
122. Jonathan Hahn, Trump’s NEPA Rollback Favors More Pollution 
and Less Community Input, SIERRA CLUB (Jul. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/HY5K-
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127.  Chairman Richard Glick, Letter from Chairman Richard Glick to 
Senator John Barrasso, M.D., FERC (Apr. 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/2L6D-Z6BB. 
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“risk” as the upstream and downstream economic and environmental 
impacts of climate change.128 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Vecinos decision is unlikely to fundamentally change the 
course of environmental justice and SCC jurisprudence under NEPA. 
The Court did not rule on the merits of Petitioners’ substantive claims, 
recognizing its role in determining the outcome of NEPA claims is 
merely to establish whether FERC’s EISs were procedurally sufficient.  
As the Court discussed, FERC will likely address deficiencies in 
its EISs to the extent required by NEPA. To vacate FERC’s Orders could 
have spelled delay and inequitable harm to Intervenors. If FERC cannot 
remedy deficiencies in its EISs, Petitioners may again look to NEPA to 
show the Projects pose glaring environmental justice and climate issues 
that cannot be explained away by taking a “harder look.” Even then, 
advocates have had only marginal success enjoining agency decisions on 
environmental justice claims before.129 They have had even less success 
enforcing implementation of SCC tools through Court orders.130  
The proceedings have not delayed the development of the 
Brownsville Projects, thus it is even less likely that any future decisions 
will stop them. Similar litigation surrounding natural gas development, 
like Sierra Club, has played out in favor of economic development, not 
environmental justice or climate issues.  Along with other project 
proposals on FERC’s docket, Vecinos has helped to raise the profile of 
environmental justice and climate issues before agency heads and 
policymakers.131 FERC is not bound to the policies of other 
administrative agencies. However, prodding from the EPA and recent 
FERC decisions suggest changes to climate policies at FERC may 
continue to unfold as part of President Biden’s promised climate agenda.  
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F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J. 2001) (Where a New Jersey District Court granted a 
preliminary injunction against the EPA and New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection for permitting an industrial facility that would disproportionately impact 
the health and environmental effect of minority groups in Camden, N.J. Plaintiffs 
demonstrated that majority-black neighborhoods in Camden exhibited 
disproportionately high rates of asthma and respiratory illness. The proposed cement 
grinding facility would have emitted ozone at higher levels than the National Ambient 
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LNG production is unlikely to decrease in the foreseeable future 
because it is widely viewed as carbon neutral.132 As such, LNG helps 
countries satisfy energy demand and meet clean energy goals as they 
divest from traditional fossil fuels.133 Shortages across the globe further 
indicate a substantial market opportunity for the United States.134 No 
matter how progressive an Administration’s views on environmental 
justice and climate, public interest balancing weighs the overall 
economic benefits of a project. The Developers will likely provide jobs 
and stimulate the local economy, and they will likely negatively impact 
nearby EJCs. Notwithstanding local impacts, the global market envisions 
LNG helping to achieve carbon emissions goals by divesting from 
traditional, dirtier fuel sources like coal. The demand for LNG is 
growing rapidly both domestically and abroad, and the United States has 
the potential to capitalize on gaps in the market.  
Tension at the Federal level between economic development and 
a need to curb carbon emissions indicates that industrial development 
(i.e., in LNG markets) is likely to continue disproportionately impacting 
lower-income and minority communities at an appreciable scale.135 Like 
the agency policies in place as this proceeding began, agency rules are 
only as strong as the statutes behind them. While Congress delays on 
passing climate legislation surrounding environmental justice and the 
SCC, decision-making at FERC and other agencies remains subject to 
the political priorities. 
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